

RADIO PROPAGANDA REPORT

CHRONICLE OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE CUBAN CRISIS

(23 - 30 OCTOBER)

A preliminary day-by-day account of Soviet propaganda on the crisis, based on FBIS reviews of Soviet broadcast output prepared as the crisis developed in the week following the President's speech

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This report presents an edited compendium of daily FBIS reviews of Soviet propaganda on the Cuban crisis, prepared on the basis of Soviet central and regional radio output and TASS transmissions as the crisis was developing.

Soviet newspapers were not available for examination as these reviews were being prepared. The newspapers will be examined subsequently, and the findings reported in a projected study of Soviet domestic press and radio behavior during the week between the President's speech and Khrushchev's 28 October message.

The daily reviews published in this report do not provide an exhaustive chronicle of Soviet radio propaganda behavior during the period covered. They must be regarded as highlights only, with special attention to selected aspects of the propaganda. The primary purpose of this compendium is to provide a reference aid for future research.

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CHRONICLE OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE CUBAN CRISIS

(23 - 30 OCTOBER)

Moscow focused its radio propaganda attention on the Cuban crisis to an extent unmatched in treatment of any prior international crisis. On 23 October, 48 percent of Moscow's commentary time was devoted to Cuban developments. The volume rose to 76 percent on the 24th, remained at 76 percent on the 25th, dropped to 71 and 68 percent on the 26th and 27th, and rose again to 73 percent on 28 October.

Reviewed below are highlights of the development of the propaganda during this period. Propagandists' lack of preparation in the fast-moving situation was apparent, particularly around 27 and 28 October when Khrushchev's two messages were released.

23 OCTOBER: THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH Prior to the President's 22 October address, domestic as well as foreign audiences had been apprised by Soviet media of the extraordinary weekend activity in Washington. The speculation about linkage of this activity to Cuba was publicized. A PRAVDA "International Review" written on 22 October for the next day's issue (reported by TASS in English) stated that "alarms news has come over the wires" to the effect that "Washington is hatching another adventure."

After the President spoke, Soviet media failed to react in any way for a full six hours. The first--indirect--reaction to the speech came six hours after it was delivered, at 0500 GMT on 23 October, in a brief Moscow domestic service news item not acknowledging the speech but quoting AFP for the report that an emergency OAS meeting was being called "in connection with new aggressive U.S. actions against Cuba." The broadcast mentioned U.S. moves to strengthen Guantanamo and reported the mobilization of Cuban troops "in view of the new U.S. provocations."

The first monitored Radio Moscow mention of the speech itself came two hours later, at 0700 GMT in an international service broadcast in English to the United Kingdom. Providing no details, this news item simply

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reported that the President spoke and went on to cite "some observers in New York" as believing that the United States "stands on the threshold of direct military action against Cuba."

Soviet domestic audiences had been told late on 22 October--in the course of a report on the unusual activity in Washington over the weekend--that "at 0200 hours Moscow time [2300 GMT on 23 October], Kennedy is to make a radio and TV appearance with a special message to the country." After the speech was delivered, domestic media kept silent until just before the issuance of the official Soviet response.

Thus at about 1245 GMT, 13 hours and 45 minutes after the speech and a quarter of an hour before the release of the Soviet Government statement, a Moscow home service newscast carried a 250-word report stating that the speech "abounded in crude anti-Soviet attacks." It quoted the President as having said that "the United States is setting up 'a strict quarantine on all types of offensive weapons being conveyed to Cuba'; that all Cuba-bound ships 'will be sent back if they are found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons' and that the quarantine 'if necessary will be extended to other types of cargo and the means for their delivery'; and that orders had been given for surveillance of Cuba and the growth of its military potential, for evacuation of families from Guantanamo, and for U.S. armed forces to be ready for any eventualities. The broadcast said that 'the President justified these measures by saying that Cuba has been turned into an 'important strategic base' of the Soviet Union." Nothing was said about rockets. This report had been transmitted by TASS in Russian to Europe about an hour earlier. It was transmitted by TASS to the Soviet domestic press at about the same time it was broadcast in Radio Moscow's domestic service. (Text of the item may be found on page BB 3 of the FBIS DAILY REPORT for 23 October.)

Soviet domestic radio listeners did not hear a longer TASS account of the substance of the speech--transmitted to foreign recipients a half hour before the release of the Soviet Government statement--which specified that the President "alleged that 'a whole series of launching sites for offensive rocket weapons' was being prepared in Cuba." This longer account said that in justification of the quarantine around Cuba, the President referred to a "mythical concentration of communist rockets" in Cuba and "did not hesitate to absolutely distort facts and openly intimidate the American people and the peoples of Latin America with nonexistent threats." According to the President, TASS continued, the threat to the Western hemisphere and world peace does not stem from the "aggressive U.S. policy" toward Cuba but from "friendly aid being rendered by the Soviet Union to the Cuban republic in the face of provocative threats and hit-and-run attacks by American imperialism." TASS claimed that the President tried to make the Soviet Union shoulder the whole blame for the tense situation and for all the possible consequences of U.S. foreign policy.

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Neither for foreign nor for domestic listeners did Radio Moscow or TASS acknowledge the President's warning that any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any Western hemisphere nation would be met with a full retaliatory response upon the USSR.

THE SOVIET GOVERN-
MENT STATEMENT

The Soviet Government statement, released at 1300 GMT on 23 October, said nothing about launching sites. And it distorted the President's warning of retaliation, representing him as having said the United States would strike "a retaliatory blow" (target unspecified) if a single nuclear bomb "falls on U.S. territory."

The 2,000-word statement was carefully noncommittal about specific Soviet counteraction. It was only half the length of the 11 September TASS statement on Cuba, which had responded to the President's request for authority to call up 150,000 reservists, and was far more measured in language. It reiterated some of the major elements in the 11 September statement--ridicule of the notion that Cuba threatens the United States, insistence on the legitimacy and purely defense character of Soviet military aid to Cuba, warnings that U.S. behavior courts thermonuclear war, and reference to Soviet nuclear-rocket capability as an effective and present operating deterrent force. Ignoring the question of missile sites, it accordingly did not use the 11 September argument--played fairly prominently in Soviet propaganda in September--that the power of Soviet rockets is such as to obviate the need for missile sites outside Soviet territory.

With the evident purpose of building up the Soviet case for presentation in the United Nations, the statement mentioned the U.N., in one way or another, eight times. Four of these references were to the U.N. Charter, including an avowal of consistent Soviet adherence to the Charter. One was a reminder of Cuban President Dorticos' UNGA speech avowing Cuban readiness to discuss differences with the United States through diplomatic channels.

The most specific statement of intended Soviet action was that the Soviet Union was requesting Security Council consideration of the U.S. "violation of the U.N. Charter and threat to peace." Otherwise the Soviet Union served notice of its intentions in generalities: "Naturally, no state which values its independence" can accede to a demand for removal of military equipment "needed for self-defense"; the USSR will strike a retaliatory blow "if the aggressors touch off a war"; and the USSR will "do everything in its power to thwart the aggressive designs of the U.S. imperialist circles, to safeguard and consolidate peace."

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In reacting specifically to the measures to intercept ships on the high seas, the statement called the U.S. course of action not aggression but "piracy," "provocation," a violation of international law, and a "challenge to all peaceloving nations." The nature of the Soviet response was not spelled out, beyond the assertion that the USSR "resolutely rejects" claims that the United States has the right to demand that states report to it on what they carry in their ships.

FOLLOWUP SOVIET
ACTIONS

Within a half hour of the release of the government statement, the Moscow domestic service reported that ambassadors of "the socialist countries" were asked to call on Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov. Domestic audiences were also told that "in connection with the provocative actions of the U.S. Government," the Soviet Government heard a report by Defense Minister Molinovskiy on measures introduced to increase the combat readiness of the armed forces and that it gave him "the required instructions." These instructions included the delay of routine demobilization and cancellation of the leaves of all personnel. TASS reported that the Warsaw Pact military chiefs were summoned by Pact commander in chief Marshal Grechko and given orders to increase military preparedness.

WORKERS
MEETINGS

An unscheduled news bulletin in the Moscow domestic service, broadcast just after the release of the Soviet Government statement, reported that a mass meeting of workers in a Moscow plant heard the statement and expressed their solidarity with the Soviet Government's stand. The broadcast said they pledged "their labor efforts for the sake of strengthening the economic and defense might of our homeland"--echoing the language of the concluding paragraph of the Soviet Government statement.

This was the first to be reported of what Moscow subsequently described as a "wave" of workers' protest meetings "rolling over the USSR." Soviet regional radios broadcast the government statement and recounted workers' meetings--in Kiev, Tbilisi, Rostov, Stavropol, Alma Ata, Dnepropetrovsk, and elsewhere throughout the country. Ukrainian stations reported interviews with Soviet citizens; Kiev devoted an entire unscheduled news program to Cuban events. Yerevan gave the subject heavy coverage. A Moldavian regional station quoted workers as pledging to strengthen the Soviet Union's "defensive might"--in this instance specifying defense only, not economic strength.

The regional accounts played up "unanimous support" for the Soviet stand and "indignant protests" at the "aggressive" American actions. Workers voiced hopes for peace to enable them to build "a just community" and a future for their children. They demanded "hands off Cuba" and pledged

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support to the "heroic Cuban people" who are "not threatening anyone." The pledges were for the most part couched in very general terms. But a Lutsk worker was quoted as saying that "those in the Pentagon should know that while we are keeping our powder dry, at any moment we can change our caps for military ones"; and Black Sea sailors, according to the Kiev radio, pledged to carry out the tasks given them "in regard to transporting cargo to revolutionary Cuba."

Workers' meetings had similarly followed up the release of the 11 September TASS statement on Cuba, but had lasted only a few days and were not publicized nearly as widely. Workers' meetings such as those described above continued throughout the week of the crisis following the President's speech.

Radio Volga, broadcasting via East Berlin to the Soviet forces in Germany, reported that soldiers of the group of forces in Germany declared they would "honorably carry out the order of the USSR Council of Ministers" given to Defense Minister Malinovskiy. (A similar reaction had been reported by Radio Volga following the 11 September TASS statement, which had noted that Malinovskiy and the Soviet Army command had orders to raise the armed forces to "peak military preparedness" following the President's request for authority to call up the reservists.) Radio Volga subsequently broadcast other meetings and pledges by the Soviet forces in Germany.

23 AND 24 OCTOBER: PROPAGANDA FOLLOWUP TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR all carried editorials on 24 October supporting the government statement, and all three were reported to Soviet domestic audiences. The review of the Soviet central press for that day which Radio Moscow broadcast to domestic listeners led off with a summary of the RED STAR editorial, entitled "We Are On Guard." It "emphasized," according to the review, that "the troops of our army and navy warmly approve the new Soviet measures for strengthening the security of our country." The paper published under the editorial photographs picturing "strategic rockets taking off" and an anti-aircraft rocket at the moment of its thrust.

The great bulk of Moscow's comment, however, echoed the Soviet Government statement and pictured the crisis more in terms of a U.S.-Cuban than a U.S.-Soviet dispute. PRAVDA's 24 October editorial spoke of the "special responsibility" that rests with the United Nations, "which is facing another and most serious test." References to the Soviet Union's "peace policy" repeatedly noted that this policy was in accord with "U.N. principles."

In publicizing the Security Council meeting on the evening of 23 October, Moscow brushed off Ambassador Stevenson's speech as a "tedious rehash of

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shopworn forgeries about the aggressive nature of communism," devoid of even a single argument "of any weight" to justify "U.S. aggression" against Cuba. The Cuban delegate's speech, treated at greater length, was characterized as "fiery and moving." And Zorin's speech was recapitulated at length, with stress on his remarks concerning the "falsity" of the U.S. position.

There were repeated echoes of the Soviet Government's warning of a Soviet retaliatory blow if war is unleashed--and the notion that the present situation courts thermonuclear war was conveyed in broadcasts to domestic as well as foreign audiences. In this context wide use was made in Moscow broadcasts, including comment for domestic audiences, of a statement attributed to Vice President Johnson that a blockade could lead to World War III. At the same time, the comment continued to play on the theme of Soviet deterrent strength and to insist that "the balance of forces has shifted in favor of the socialist countries." IZVESTIYA's editorial said the American "adventurists" are so blinded by hatred of Cuba that "they forget what century they are living in." The "ravings" of these people, the editorial said, will be answered by the Soviet people "with further consolidation around the ranks of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government," and "imperialist aggression will not prevent us from continuing to fulfill our great international duty of support and aid to peoples defending their freedom and independence."

A microcosm of the general Soviet propaganda line was contained in a special appeal "to the people of New York and San Francisco, Detroit and Des Moines, to the Pittsburgh steel smelter, the New Orleans longshoreman, the California farmer, the Oklahoma rancher, and the Harvard student," broadcast by Radio Moscow to North America on the 24th. The appeal warned that "the flames of war may sweep in from the Caribbean and engulf your home too," and then it will be too late to stop and think. It harped on the absurdity of the notion that Cuba, with a population of less than New York City, threatens the United States. It said the USSR "has no bases anywhere in the world," having closed down the last one in 1955. It insisted that it is not the Cuban Government which is carrying on subversive activities, not Cuba which does not wish to be a good neighbor. And it repeated charges of the "illegality" of a blockade, assurances that the Soviet Government would never use its weapons for aggression, and the warning that the United States would assume a "grave responsibility" if it carried out the actions announced by the President.

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RESPONSE TO THE
QUARANTINE

The propaganda remained equivocal in regard to the Soviet response to the quarantine measures, with most comment simply denouncing the measures as a violation of international law undertaken with "provocative" intent. Soviet media did not mention TASS President Goryunov's statement in Japan (reported by AFP and widely publicized in the West) that should the United States attack Soviet ships, "Soviet Russia will sink American ships." The President's signing of the declaration formalizing the measures was reported briefly by TASS in English shortly after the signing and five hours later in TASS transmissions in Russian for domestic consumption. Withholding any statement of how the Soviet Union might behave if one of its ships were stopped, Moscow commentators introduced the notion that the U.S. move set a precedent which--in the words of one commentator--"would lead to more than an intensification of tension in the world." This commentator, broadcasting in Arabic on 23 October, said "we may conclude that the Soviet Union could now stop and inspect all ships going to Turkey, for example."

MISSILE
SITES

Commentators continued to avoid any denial of the President's specific statements about the construction of missile sites, speaking in general terms of U.S. "falsehoods" and "hypocrisy" and reiterating--as in the Soviet Government statement--generalized descriptions of the "purely defensive" nature of Soviet military aid to Cuba, requested by Cuba to protect itself against "threats." IZVESTIYA's 24 October editorial, like other comment, repeated that the question of Cuban security and defense is a matter of "the exclusive jurisdiction of Cuba itself."

Commentators set out to impugn the veracity of the President's "allegations" without denying them unequivocally. They obscured the issue by referring most often simply to U.S. charges about Soviet "offensive" weapons--and responded most often by reiterating, in effect, the notion that all weapons in the hands of the Soviet (or "socialist") people are by definition defensive. Such propaganda was addressed to foreign and domestic audiences alike, with the disparagements and denials hedged in various ways.

One device was to refer to "so-called indisputable evidence" and "so-called incontrovertible intelligence"--casting doubt on the nature of the U.S. evidence rather than on the truth of what the President said. This device was used in a "roundtable discussion" broadcast to Soviet listeners on 23 October: One participant referred to the Defense Department's use of "some kind of faked photographs taken from spy planes" to "thrust on the public some alleged facts accusing Cuba of having offensive weapons, and so forth."

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The argument that the Soviet Union's powerful rockets obviate the need for missile sites outside its boundaries--used in the 11 September TASS statement on Cuba--was employed several times in Moscow's comment for domestic consumption, but not in commentaries beamed abroad. Zorin did use it in his speech to the Security Council on the evening of 23 October, explicitly quoting from the 11 September TASS statement; and Moscow broadcast Zorin's remarks widely to all audiences, foreign and domestic. But use of the argument without attributing it to last month's TASS statement appeared repeatedly only in propaganda for domestic consumption.

† For example, a regional broadcast from Kyzyl, in Eastern Siberia, quoted an officer as having said at a protest meeting that "the Soviet Union possesses the newest kinds of nuclear equipment and powerful rocket carriers...so that there is no need to seek installation sites anywhere beyond the boundaries of the USSR."

† Commentator Shragin told Radio Moscow's domestic audience on 24 October (in the course of an elaborate explanation that the Soviet Union "does supply Cuba with a certain quantity of arms," at Cuba's request in the face of threats, and "exclusively for defensive purposes") that

as for the allegations, false from beginning to end, about Soviet offensive rockets in Cuba, one thing is quite clear: Our country has no need to transfer the means at our disposal to repulse an aggressor, and for a counterstrike, to the territory of any other country, for example Cuba. The Soviet Union has sufficiently powerful rocket carriers for these nuclear warheads, and there is no need to seek sites for them outside the borders of our country.

† Another Radio Moscow talk to the home audience on 24 October declared that "our country has not sent and is not sending Cuba any offensive types of weapons." (The phrase "offensive types" of weapons is unusual. The normal propaganda practice is to distinguish offensive from defensive weapons in terms of purpose rather than type.) This commentary went on to say that "the Soviet Union has such powerful carrier rockets with nuclear warheads that there is no need to seek sites for them beyond the confines of our country."

**SOVIET DOMESTIC
NEWSCASTS**

The Cuban crisis monopolized Soviet domestic service newscasts for 23 October following the release of the Soviet Government statement. Emphasis was on the statement itself and Soviet popular support, as well as world reaction critical of the U.S. action. The pattern of the 23d continued into the 24th, with reportage of Soviet and world reaction highlighted. An early

evening program on the 24th led off by announcing the Soviet rejection of the U.S. note on the blockade. This was followed by a report on Castro's speech and a report on the Czechoslovak Government statement on the crisis. Fourth place was given to a report that the Brazilian Government had expressed hope for U.N. action to preserve peace, and fifth place to a report on the President's proclamation of the quarantine. Items six and seven reported British protests against the quarantine; item eight reported the Soviet people's "indignation"; item nine, resumption of the Security Council session; item ten, Soviet workers pledged to fulfill orders for deliveries to Cuba. Other stories recounted the Hungarian Government statement, a Bulgarian protest meeting, and a statement by Tito.

By late evening of 23 October, three items on other subjects had preceded reports related to the Cuban crisis: a Rumanian delegation arrived in the USSR, GDR leaders thanked their Soviet counterparts for anniversary greetings, and Mikoyan received the CPR ambassador. Topics treated on domestic newscasts during the 24th included Ulbricht's dinner for Gromyko and the latter's departure for Moscow, Souphanouvong's arrival in Irkutsk en route home, U.S. businessman Knox' meeting with Khrushchev at the former's request, and a MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY report on activity at the British base in Aden.

BERTRAND RUSSELL Bertrand Russell's telegrams to the President, Prime
MESSAGES Minister Macmillan, and Premier Khrushchev were re-
 reported by TASS to foreign recipients under a London
dateline late on 23 October.

The exchange between Russell and the Soviet Premier was heavily played in domestic propaganda on the 24th. The texts of Russell's message to Khrushchev and Khrushchev's reply were carried four times in full in domestic service newscasts: A late-evening newscast on the 24th, leading off with both texts, reported less prominently--in 10th place--that Russell had also sent messages to the President, Prime Minister Macmillan, and U Thant. There was no comment in domestic media on the exchange, or on the idea of "high-level negotiations" raised in Khrushchev's response.

25 OCTOBER: STRESS ON SOVIET PEACEABLENESS, HEDGED DENIALS OF BASES

EXCHANGES WITH The Khrushchev reply to Bertrand Russell on 24 Octo-
RUSSELL, U THANT ber was broadcast widely by Radio Moscow to foreign
 audiences through 25 October, but commentators de-
voted little attention to Khrushchev's statement that a high-level
meeting would be useful.

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In domestic media the exchange was heavily played, but without any comment on the notion of high-level talks. TASS' review of the Soviet central press for 25 October noted that the Russell-Khrushchev exchange was frontpaged,* although the press review did not lead off with this fact. In summing up Khrushchev's response, the TASS press review did not mention the bid for high-level talks.

Soviet commentators portrayed world public opinion as impressed by the Soviet leader's earnest of peaceful intent in his reply to Russell--his assurances, responding directly to Russell's language, that the Soviet Government would "not take any reckless decisions" and would "not permit itself to be provoked."

Moscow reported to domestic as well as foreign audiences that U Thant had called on all interested parties to refrain from action which would worsen the situation and court the danger of war. Publicity was also given the text of Bertrand Russell's message thanking Khrushchev for his "inspiring reply" of the preceding day.

Regular news programming in the Soviet domestic service was interrupted late on 25 October to carry--without comment--the text of U Thant's message to Khrushchev and Khrushchev's answer agreeing to a suspension of weapons shipments to Cuba if there were a corresponding suspension of the U.S. blockade. The messages appeared again in subsequent news bulletins and were transmitted by TASS abroad. Briefly reporting the President's reply to U Thant's message, the domestic service and TASS quoted him as stating that "Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss promptly these arrangements with you." There was no comment.

NUCLEAR-MISSILE In two commentaries for foreign, but not domestic,
SITES audiences, Radio Moscow went so far as to say that
 "there are no...long-range rockets" in Cuba (in a
talk broadcast only in English to the United Kingdom on the 25th) and
that "the report about military rockets is absolute nonsense" (in a com-
mentary by Alekseyev broadcast four times to Arab and Near Eastern
audiences).

The denials continued to be carefully hedged. The devices used were illustrated in a Vavilov commentary of 25 October: Vavilov said the President's statement "that a threat was created with the location of offensive rockets in Cuba is...a great

* The press review also noted that PRAVDA devoted "nearly half a page" to the text of Castro's 23 October interview.

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lie"--ambiguous phraseology which impugns the accuracy of the statement taken as a whole. Vavilov asked: "Can anybody say that he has seen these Soviet weapons of attack in Cuba?"--the device used in earlier comment, casting doubt on the validity or conclusiveness of the U.S. evidence rather than denying the fact itself. The commentator answered his rhetorical question: "No. The USSR and the Cuban Government have reiterated that there are no aggressive weapons in Cuba. Soviet aid to Cuba is of a purely defensive nature"--the customary line reflecting the propaganda premise that an offensive weapon is one intended for aggression and that all Soviet weapons are defensive. This commentary was broadcast three times to Africa, as well as in Turkish, Greek, Persian, Arabic, German, French, Italian, Dutch, Hungarian, and Serbocroat--a total of 19 times. It was not used in the Soviet domestic service.

Alekseyev's commentary cited above similarly attacked as "a great lie" the President's statement "that there are in Cuba Soviet rockets for offensive purposes which are expected to deal a blow at the Western countries."

STEVENSON-ZORIN
EXCHANGE

A long Petrushenko-Bogachov dispatch on the Security Council session of 25 October put repeated stress on Zorin's attacks--in his "vivid speech replete with facts"--on the nature of the U.S. evidence. The dispatch quoted him as saying Ambassador Stevenson "offered no proof that Cuba is creating a threat to the Western hemisphere" and referred repeatedly to Stevenson's presentation of "irrefutable facts," always putting the phrase in quotation marks. The dispatch included Zorin's use of Walter Lippmann's comment--Lippmann "writes today that he sees the danger of the mistake committed in that when President Kennedy met Gromyko Thursday and had information about a rocket buildup on Cuba he did not present this information to Gromyko."

Ambassador Stevenson's direct challenge to Zorin to confirm or deny the existence of the missile sites was carefully obscured in the dispatch: "The American delegate tried to assume the role of an accuser and to put questions to the Soviet representative which can only be described as demagogic. 'We are not in an American court and I am not going to reply to your questions....' the Soviet delegate told Stevenson." The dispatch concluded that Ambassador Stevenson was "rebuffed" and "changed his tone."

Moscow propaganda for domestic consumption by and large stayed away from the question of missile sites.

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SHIPS EN ROUTE TO CUBA Still silent on the question of Soviet ships en route to Cuba, and continuing to denounce the quarantine as "piracy" and "a crude violation of international law," Soviet media put increasing stress--particularly in broadcasts for domestic consumption--on reports of "peaceful cargoes" sent to Cuba. A TASS transmission to the Soviet press on 25 October reported the departure of the Italian ship Maria Lauritana from Kherson, bound for Odessa and then Cuba, with some 6,300 tons of chemical fertilizers. Another TASS item for the domestic press enumerated items of "peaceful freight" being shipped from Soviet ports to Cuba--machinery, medical equipment, boilers, canned goods, automatic presses, and so forth. Radio Moscow told Soviet home audiences on 25 October that "Riga port-workers today sent off a lot of cargo to the fraternal country--engines for agricultural machines, automobiles, machine tools, and other industrial equipment."

The Kiev regional service reported on 25 October that "more than 200 industrial enterprises of Lvov...are shipping their goods, which serve peaceful purposes, to Cuba." A Nikolayev regional broadcast quoted a worker in a transport hoisting equipment plant as saying that his factory "produces goods for peaceful purposes," but that "the imperialists should know that we can readapt our machine tools for different purposes."

MALINOVSKIY ON MILITARY PREPAREDNESS Brief TASS summaries of Malinovskiy's speech to an all-army conference on ideological questions--published in the 25 October issue of RED STAR--focused on the Defense Minister's claims of Soviet advanced weapons capabilities. While the speech apparently projected an image of great retaliatory strength and military preparedness, Malinovskiy's specific claims regarding weapons capabilities did not appear to go beyond previous Soviet statements in any substantial respect.

Malinovskiy's statement that "recently" the Soviet armed forces had taken a "major new step" in their technical equipment apparently referred to the so-called "global" rocket and to antimissile defenses: these weapons systems were specifically identified in the immediately following sentences. Regarding antimissile defenses, Malinovskiy's statement implied a somewhat more advanced stage of development than had heretofore been conveyed in Soviet statements. Whereas previous statement had been ambiguous as to the actual operational status of antimissile defenses, Malinovskiy now stated that "complexes of many means for the country's defense against nuclear rocket attack by the enemy have been designed and built."

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Malinovskiy repeated the assertion--frequently made before--that "the essence of the strategy of the imperialists is the preparation of preventive war, a sudden nuclear attack." The Cuban issue, he implied, is to be interpreted in this light. It is simply the latest in a series of provocations instigated by "the United States and its partners in the aggressive military blocs."

The TASS summaries gave no indication that Malinovskiy made any specific threats of military action. The posture conveyed, rather, was one of generalized warning combined with an assertion of high military preparedness. The Soviet counter to the "imperialist" strategy of preventive war, asserted Malinovskiy, is a "high state of preparedness and the indestructible battle capacity of the armed forces." This means, he explained, "that the entire might of our armed forces at the first signal must be immediately put into action against the enemy, its military-strategic, economic, and political centers, against its main concentrations of forces."

NUCLEAR-FREE
ZONE IN
LATIN AMERICA

Soviet propaganda ignored the idea advanced by Brazil for a U.N. move to declare Latin America and Africa off limits for nuclear weapons, bases, and testing.

Background: TASS on 21 September 1962, in reporting the preceding day's UNGA session, had duly reported that the Brazilian delegate "supported the idea of establishing denuclearized zones and said Latin America could be such a zone," but followup Moscow commentary did not pick up the idea. Since the UNGA speech by Brazilian delegate Melo Franco on 20 September, Radio Moscow's sole reference to the idea was a brief mention in a 23 October commentary beamed to Latin America--after President Kennedy made his speech, but before Soviet media acknowledged it--alleging that the United States planned to build a military base in Paraguay and recalling briefly that the Brazilian delegate had raised the possibility of a Latin American nuclear-free zone. The commentator added that the Mexican representative had made a similar suggestion.

Khrushchev on various occasions has referred to the desirability of such zones in "various parts" of the world, without specifying Latin America. Gromyko on 24 April in the USSR Supreme Soviet spoke of the "deep concern" of "Asian, African, and Latin American spokesmen" over U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons in other countries' territories; he remarked that Mexico had forbidden the introduction of nuclear weapons on its territory and "thus...has begun to implement the atom-free zone idea." But neither Khrushchev nor Gromyko has specifically called for a Latin American nuclear-free zone.

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Routine comment, particularly since March and the opening of the Geneva disarmament talks, has mentioned Latin America along with other areas as a possible zone for denuclearization, but has given far more attention to the idea of such zones in Central Europe, Africa, the Balkans, and the Pacific and Far East.

Moscow's reportage on the Geneva disarmament sessions and later the UNGA proceedings referred only briefly to calls for a Latin American nuclear-free zone. Brazilian and other Latin American U.N. delegates' support for the "idea" or "concept" of such a zone in the hemisphere was reported, rather than Brazil's intention to submit an actual plan. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister David, Albanian Foreign Minister Shtylla, and Rumanian delegate Malica, addressing the General Assembly, all included Latin America as a desirable area for denuclearization as a "partial disarmament measure," but TASS publicized only the Rumanian delegate's remarks to this effect. TASS did note, in reporting the 16 October afternoon session of UNGA's Political Committee, that the Chilean delegate said his country "insisted" on establishing a nuclear-free zone in the hemisphere.

26 OCTOBER: CONTINUED STRESS ON U.S. "PROVOCATIONS," SOVIET PEACEABLENESS

Selective reportage continued on the 26th, with publicity for U Thant's announcement that he would begin confidential talks with U.S., Cuban, and Soviet representatives. Bertrand Russell's statement dictated over the telephone late on the night of the 25th to the TASS office in London was also reported.

Publicity was given to a report that the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia had appealed to U Thant to help the United Nations preserve world peace, "threatened by the actions of the U.S. Government against Cuban territory." The propaganda continued to blur the issue of Soviet-U.S. confrontation, picturing the basic issue in the crisis as between the United States and Cuba and casting the Soviet Union in the role of adherent of peace in the face of "provocations."

"All thinking Americans" were said to admire the "calmness, mature judgment, and wisdom" displayed by the Soviet Union, said to be epitomized in Khrushchev's responses to Russell and U Thant. The "campaign of war hysteria" in the United States was "beginning to miss," Radio Moscow's audiences heard, now that the people realize that "the Soviet Government does not respond to provocations." Publicity was given a telegram from the peace committee of Lake Forest College, Illinois, asking the USSR "to do everything to retain the soberness of mind "on which the survival of mankind depends."

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TASS' review of the Soviet press on the 26th reported that the papers published the Khrushchev-U Thant exchange as well as Russell's congratulations to Khrushchev on his stand. A PRAVDA editorial broadcast by the domestic service, repeating Khrushchev's 24 October reply to Russell, commented that mankind heralds it as a "triumph of reason and goodwill and love of peace of the great Soviet power." PRAVDA said the world expected the U.S. Government to "heed the voice of reason" and realize that the aggravated situation could "push the world to the abyss of war."

A Viktorov commentary (broadcast 30 times to foreign audiences) pointed out that "in these days of trial, the Soviet Union has shown by facts that it is ready to do anything to avoid war." Now, he said, it is up to the West--"and not only the United States, but the other Western Powers, who can be dragged into adventures contemplated by Washington's aggressive circles." A commentary beamed to Africa, saying that Khrushchev's reply to U Thant showed the Soviet Government's "sincere wish" to solve the situation in the Caribbean by "peaceful means," recalled Zorin's "confirmation" in the Security Council that the USSR "has never sent nor is sending any offensive weapons to Cuba." While the real question is the U.S. attempt to organize "direct aggression against Cuba," the commentary said, "the Soviet Government considers the problem of war and peace of such importance that it would be useful to organize a summit meeting to counteract the menace of a thermonuclear war"--one of very few references to the idea of a high-level meeting.

A domestic service commentary on Chancellor Adenauer's speech on Cuba said Adenauer "did not omit" the West Berlin question. "The Western Powers, stated the Bonn Chancellor, like us will defend this city under any circumstances, although as is known, no danger threatens West Berlin."

DOMESTIC SERVICE NEWSCASTS

A sampling of Moscow domestic newscasts on 26 October reflected continuing heavy attention to the crisis, although one early evening newscast gave precedence over Cuban material to an item on congratulations from the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers to Sumy Oblast workers for successfully fulfilling their grain sale plan, and a later newscast led off with four items on economic subjects.

News stories relating to Cuba included reports on U Thant's speech in the Security Council, Zorin's remarks on the legal aspects of the quarantine, Pope John's statement, and Prime Minister Macmillan's report to the House of Commons supporting the U.S. position. Dennis Pritt was quoted as stating in London that the U.S. Government is behaving hysterically, possessed by the idea of anticommunism; and the Mayor of Teheran, interviewed by a TASS correspondent, was said to approve Khrushchev's "wise policy" in advocating peaceful coexistence.

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Latin American reaction was described in items on a demonstration at the U.S. embassy in Guatemala, Bolivian miners' and Colombian students' protests against U.S. actions, and a Venezuelan Communist Party call for intensification of the struggle against U.S. "aggression."

Bloc reaction was reported in items on mass meetings in East Berlin and Hungary, and such meetings were said to be taking place "in the towns and villages of all the socialist countries." The CPR Government statement on Cuba was the 12th item of an evening newscast.

Other foreign news items reported protests in Italy against U.S. actions, and a statement by the political bureau of the Algerian FLN expressing solidarity with the Cuban people.

According to "press reports," one item said, over a thousand American students in east coast towns will take part in a protest march on Washington, and demonstrations will be held in Ohio, Washington, Texas, California, Florida, and Hawaii, while a huge peace rally is being organized in Chicago. The item added that a joint statement by eight American peace organizations, stressing that the blockade of Cuba is unjust and will lead to catastrophe, concludes that there is an "honorable and reasonable alternative to the present policy: it is talks."

Reporting reaction at home, Moscow said that the words "we are with you, Cuba!" could be heard throughout the USSR. Soldiers at an unspecified tank training ground were said to be working with the words "Cuba is in danger" in their minds, and to have promised to carry out the Soviet Government's instructions to the defense ministry. Cuban students studying in Stavropol Kray had met to discuss the Soviet Government's statement, the radio reported, and the Cuban people, "full of battle readiness," were said to be discussing Khrushchev's answer to Bertrand Russell; the Cubans, Moscow said, welcomed statements by Soviet citizens as being of "great moral support."

SHIPS EN ROUTE TO CUBA

Prior to the release of Khrushchev's message to U Thant agreeing to instruct Soviet ships to keep away from the interception zone, TASS early on 27 October broke Moscow's silence on the question of Soviet ships to Cuba, describing for foreign recipients the arrival of the Soviet tanker Vinnitsa in Havana after passing through the U.S. blockade. The agency also reported the arrival in Havana of a Swedish ship which had sailed through the blockade zone, as well as the search of the Lebanese vessel Marucla. The domestic service, which also carried the latter report, continued to play up the delivery to Cuba of "peaceful goods" from Soviet enterprises.

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RED STAR
COMMENT

As was the case throughout the crisis, the military press appeared to contain the most militant comment. Brief TASS reviews of a RED STAR "Observer" article published on 26 October contained warnings addressed specifically to an anticipated U.S. invasion of Cuba. Entitled "Cuba Is Not Alone," the article sought to convey the impression that war might be triggered by further U.S. action against Cuba. Asserting that measures which the U.S. "ruling circles" had decided upon might lead the world into an "atomic holocaust," RED STAR said that the Pentagon was now preparing an attack on Cuba with the employment of regular U.S. troops. The article pointed out that "the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, and the peaceloving peoples have enough forces and means to curb those who, in their madness, are contemplating a crime against world peace."

RED STAR went on to specify--as Malinovskiy had done the day before--the claimed achievements in military technology which constitute the substance of the Soviet military warning. Judging by the reviews, however, no specific Soviet countermeasures to a U.S. invasion were pledged. One review noted the directive of the USSR Council of Ministers to take all measures to "enhance the combat readiness of the armed forces"--measures which, it explained, applied above all to the strategic rocket forces. The subsequent review stated in this connection only that "all progressive mankind is coming out in defense of the island of freedom." Despite this absence of specific commitments, however, the article appeared to carry a more than usually threatening tone.

A similarly threatening tone was apparent in a less authoritative dispatch by Yuriy Zhukov and Victor Mayevskiy datelined Andover, published in the 26 October issue of PRAVDA. The correspondents said that the United States had been taken to a line "beyond which a single step would take it to the calamity of war."

27 OCTOBER: KHRUSHCHEV'S TURKISH-FOR-CUBAN BASES MESSAGEGENERAL PATTERN
PRIOR TO RELEASE
OF THE MESSAGE

Prior to the issuance of Khrushchev's message to President Kennedy, the focus of Moscow comment on the Cuban crisis appeared to have shifted somewhat from generalized warnings of the dire consequences of U.S. actions to a more positive presentation of the asserted efforts of the Soviet Union to preserve peace and to a more detailed indictment of the motives and objectives of U.S. policy. The TASS press review of 27 October indicated that Moscow newspapers were continuing to convey an impression of world approbation for Khrushchev's responses to Bertrand Russell and to U Thant.

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The continuing attack on the U.S. actions appeared to be developing new emphases: more stress on deprecation of the veracity of U.S. documentation of missile base activity on Cuba, and pointed reminders of the presence of U.S. missile bases on foreign territory. At the same time, Moscow appeared to be drawing increased attention to alleged indications of further U.S. actions against Cuba.

U.S. "FAKED"
PHOTOGRAPHS

Continuing to maintain that there were no Soviet offensive sites in Cuba, Moscow laid increasing stress on efforts to discredit the documentation which the United States had presented. According to TASS, an "international commentary" by Borisov in SOVIET RUSSIA "unmasks the fakes fabricated by the Pentagon." The paper said that "according to an announcement," photographs shown at a Pentagon press conference and published in London "depict pads under construction in Cuba for the launching of 'offensive' rockets"--the most explicit reference to the nature of U.S. documentation in available Moscow comment up to that time. These photographs, the paper said, revealed the "shakiness" of the arguments used to justify the "military measures under preparation."

A Buranov commentary (broadcast 10 times to foreign audiences) said the publication of the photographs was "awkward for the Americans," since many British observers doubted the authenticity of the photographs, and State Department representatives "had to admit their publication was a mistake." The proof Washington "claims to possess is obviously a fabrication," Buranov claimed. But to support the statement that "the Soviet and Cuban governments have repeatedly said there are no offensive rocket weapons in Cuba," he resorted to the evasive devices characteristic of earlier propaganda, saying that "it is sufficient to raise the question of whether there are really Soviet rockets of an offensive type in Cuba in order to shatter the [U.S.] Government's argument." A brief domestic service item, attacking the "mendacious blabber that Soviet offensive weapons are located in Cuba," charged that the documents "allegedly confirming" this were "fabricated by the CIA," but failed to elaborate on the nature of the documents.

U.S. FOREIGN
BASES

From 25 through 27 October, there had been several reiterations of the theme that had been prominent in propaganda surrounding the 11 September TASS statement on Cuba--an alleged inconsistency between the United States' concern over bases in Cuba and its own policy of maintaining bases in other countries. Such references were scattered, however, and did not represent a strong concerted propaganda effort to push this theme.

A Korionov article in PRAVDA on 26 October contained one such comment in the period preceding the release of Khrushchev's 27 October proposal.

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Korionov quoted a U.S. source to document the charge that the United States was maintaining over 130 large military bases abroad. Unlike Cuba, it asserted, which was acquiring arms for defensive purposes only, the U.S. bases were "bases of aggression." Why, it asked rhetorically, if the United States is really desirous of peace, does it not accept the proposal which the Soviet Union has been making for a number of years--remove all foreign military bases on all foreign territories? TASS on 26 October reported the call of the Politburo of the Dutch Communist Party for the removal of American nuclear weapons from Holland. Only a policy of neutrality and "the liquidation of foreign bases" can serve as a guarantee of the security of our country, the statement was reported as stressing.

Leontyev, writing in RED STAR on 27 October, drew the parallel more directly. If the United States demands the removal of "Soviet military equipment" from Cuba, he asked, why should not the United States withdraw American equipment and troops from the "hundreds of military bases set up around the Soviet Union?" Noting the U.S. argument that Cuba is "very near" the United States, Leontyev referred to a countering argument: "What about American bases near the Soviet frontiers?"

Some specific identification of U.S. bases in Turkey in this connection was also made. A roundtable discussion broadcast by the domestic service on 23 October included the observation--attributed to the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN--that the Soviet Union would be within its rights to counter the U.S. blockade of Cuba with a similar blockade of Western bases, "for example, of Turkey." And on 25 October, the Soviet clandestine "Our Radio," broadcasting to Turkey, dilated on the danger to that country posed by the presence of U.S. bases. Asserting that the United States had alerted its military forces and rocket bases in Turkey, the commentator pointed out that Turkey would be a legitimate target of retaliatory attack if war broke out. Quoting the London radio as the source of its prediction, the broadcast also noted that the Soviet Union would be likely to take retaliatory action against Turkey in response to the U.S. blockade of Cuba. The same transmitter, in a 27 October broadcast, listed "American and NATO military installations in our country" and said there was a "depot for rockets with atomic warheads" near each of the "rocket bases." The radio warned that "here is a grave deep and wide enough to bury us if an attack launched from our territory brings retaliation."

THE 27 OCTOBER
KHRUSHCHEV
MESSAGE

Khrushchev's message to President Kennedy, proposing the dismantling of Soviet offensive missile bases in Cuba in exchange for a reciprocal dismantling of U.S. installations in Turkey, was broadcast over the

Soviet domestic service at 1400 GMT with 50 minutes prior notification. Couched in respectful and businesslike terms, the message acknowledged

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the President's desire for peace and the legitimacy of his concern for the security of the United States. While reiterating the standard Soviet protestations regarding the purely "defensive" nature of Soviet aid to Cuba, the message conceded, in effect, that the Soviet missile bases had been installed to strengthen the Soviet strategic posture. For the first time in any Soviet public utterance, Khrushchev asserted that the "means situated in Cuba" were in the hands of Soviet officers, and that hence they would be used only in response to an attack on Cuba, the Soviet Union, or the Soviet Union's allies. To the same point, he argued that the "equal military capacities" of the United States and the Soviet Union--an apparent reference to President Kennedy's reported statement in Vienna in 1961--invests the Soviet Union with the same right to act in Cuba as the United States has acted in Turkey.

In the operative sections of his message, Khrushchev proposed that the Soviet Union and the United States reciprocally undertake (1) to remove "offensive means" from Cuba and Turkey, respectively; (2) to permit "persons enjoying the confidence of the U.N. Security Council" to ratify the fulfillment of the pledges assumed; and (3) to declare "within the framework of the Security Council" their commitments to respect and protect the inviolability of the territorial integrity and internal sovereignty of Turkey and Cuba, respectively.

27-28 OCTOBER: TIME-MARKING PROPAGANDA IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN
KHRUSHCHEV'S TWO PUBLICIZED MESSAGES

In the 24 hours between the release of Khrushchev's letter of 27 October and the release of his letter unconditionally promising to dismantle the Cuban bases, Moscow propaganda contained elements of a time-marking character. Propagandists did not mount a strong, concerted campaign to push the idea of a Cuban-for-Turkish bases exchange. The President's letter to Khrushchev was not acknowledged, Soviet media having kept totally silent on the Soviet leader's Friday night (26 October) letter. The White House statement rejecting the idea of a reciprocal dismantling of bases--ignored in Khrushchev's letter of 28 October--was unmentioned in Soviet media. (A Budapest broadcast did acknowledge and deplore the President's rejection of Khrushchev's terms.) Routine propaganda attacks on the U.S. quarantine continued. But Soviet commentators by and large dropped their efforts to impugn the veracity of U.S. documentation of missile-base activity in Cuba.

The text of the 27 October message displaced the leading articles in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR on the 28th. But there was remarkably little comment. Prominence was given instead to reports of worldwide protests against U.S. "piratical" actions; publicity for Soviet and world public

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support of Cuba continued, though in lesser volume than the publicity for the protests. And in denouncing the U.S. for piracy and flouting of international norms of behavior, the propaganda put declining emphasis on warnings of the risks which the United States was incurring.

The TASS review of the Soviet press for the 28th, highlighting the publicity for the text of Khrushchev's Turkish-for-Cuban bases message, did report two supporting articles--one in PRAVDA and one in IZVESTIYA--emphasizing an inconsistency between the U.S. position regarding the Cuban bases and the fact of the U.S. worldwide network of bases. PRAVDA, according to the TASS review, said that the President, in complaining about Soviet military aid to Cuba, "deliberately passed over in silence the real threat to all nations presented by the dense network of American military bases on foreign territories which has covered the whole world" like an "ominous cobweb." The press review quoted IZVESTIYA commentator Matveyev as saying that the "latest rash action" of the United States points up the need to "liquidate" the U.S. bases and is "fraught with serious consequences" for the United States and its allies. But TASS' review of these articles cited no specific argumentation in justification of Khrushchev's choice of Turkey bases as the quid pro quo for Cuba bases.

RED STAR
COMMENT

RED STAR continued to contain the most bellicose statements. TASS reviewed an article in the paper by General Yakubovskiy, commander in chief of Soviet troops in Germany, who charged--in reference to the "hotbed of war" in West Germany--that "the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have everything necessary for doing away with the imperialist vultures once and for all." TASS' account of the article did not mention the Cuban crisis, but TASS' review of the press cited Yakubovskiy's remarks in the context of denunciations of U.S. actions in regard to Cuba. Another RED STAR article, broadcast in full in the Moscow domestic service, said that "the word 'blockade' has always been synonymous with war" and called the quarantine "an attempt to kindle a new world conflagration in which millions of people would be incinerated." He referred to the President's "readiness to embark on unleashing a world war." A third article in RED STAR, by "legal specialist" Kosityn, declared that the blockade is "no less an international crime than direct armed invasion would be."

MILD COMMENT IN
DOMESTIC SERVICE

In sharp contrast with the tone of these articles, a Shragin commentary broadcast in Moscow's domestic service was completely devoid of any threatening words or overtones, even in its brief reference to U.S. bases. It observed mildly that "if the United States believes it has the right" to demand removal of what it considers "offensive" Soviet weapons in Cuba, then "it will be natural to recognize the right of the Soviet Union to demand

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withdrawal of American destructive rocket bases from Turkey, a country which is our next-door neighbor." Khrushchev's letter, he said, again demonstrates the "love of peace" and "mature presence of mind" of the Soviet Government.

A PRAVDA article by Frantsev led off with a few passages on U.S. "aggressive" actions against Cuba, then dropped the focus on Cuba and launched into a long review of historical aggression by Western imperialist countries.

DOMESTIC SERVICE NEWSCASTS

Soviet domestic service newscasts in the interval between the two Khrushchev messages were not wholly monopolized by the Cuban crisis and seemed of a time-marking character. Publicity for Khrushchev's 27 October letter led off most of the news programs, with the text of the letter itself repeated for domestic listeners at 1500 GMT. Prominence continued to be given throughout the day to reportage of heavy publicity for the letter in the world press, and to Soviet citizens' telegrams supporting their government's stand. But available monitored information on the news programs shows no special effort to highlight Soviet or worldwide support of a Cuban-for-Turkish bases exchange specifically. Support for the Soviet "peaceful initiative" in general was stressed.

There were several items reporting protests by Cuban and other groups denouncing U.S. actions against Cuba as a threat to world peace. These included a report of a Cuban peace movement protest against U.S. plans for a Cuban invasion. There were also a few reports reinforcing the image of an aggressive United States--a UPI report on two new nuclear tests, a Guayaquil-dated report of U.S. construction of a new naval base, a report on the conclusion of U.S. military maneuvers in West Germany, a report from Istanbul on three instances in which American GI's had "misbehaved" and "aroused popular wrath." But these are items of a sort that would routinely appear in Soviet newscasts. Available information on the news shows contained no other reportage on Turkey.

The newscasts also carried a number of innocuous items unrelated to the crisis: Sixth place on the 1900 GMT newscast on the 27th, for example, reported Khrushchev-Brezhnev congratulations to the North Korean leaders on their re-election to government office. Seventh place congratulated some Soviet workers on overfulfillment of the state plan for grain deliveries. By 0200 GMT on 28 October, the domestic service news program was devoting considerable time to items unrelated to the crisis. The program led off with a report on French opinion in support of the Khrushchev letter, Brazilian popular support for Cuba, and student demonstrations outside the White House. But it also reported that the Yemeni Deputy Premier had outlined Yemen's economic plans; that members of a

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Soviet film industry delegation had given a press conference in Beirut on the eve of a Soviet film festival; that the Vice President of the USSR Academy of Arts attended the opening of a Soviet art exhibit in Copenhagen; that Polish museums were preparing for the October revolution anniversary; and that Bulgaria fulfilled its production plan for the first nine months of 1962 by 102.3 percent.

**MOSCOW BROAD-
CASTS TO CUBA**

Radio Moscow's broadcasts to Cuba during the interval between Khrushchev's letters similarly highlighted the 27 October Khrushchev letter, with texts of the letter itself followed by highlights of the letter as reported by REUTERS and other news agencies. Considerable stress was given to reportage and comment avowing Soviet support for Cuba, couched in general terms--assurances that "the mighty socialist camp is at Cuba's side, and it will go on being free and independent." A commentary at 0030 GMT on 28 October entitled "Cuba, We Are at Your Side" carried statements by Soviet writers--from Dagestan, Latvia, Georgia--avowing Soviet understanding and support for the Cuban people. A Georgian woman painter was quoted on the "greatness of the Cuban soul." A Latvian writer said Ernest Hemingway, a "true American," would disapprove of those who today strike at Cuba.

Other comment reviewed Cuba's historical struggles against "colonialism" and pictured the "new era" under Castro in which Cuba has held to the slogan "Cuba, Si, Yanqui, No" and refused to submit. Available monitored reports do not indicate that a special effort was made in these broadcasts to argue the case for the proposal advanced in Khrushchev's 27 October letter.

**28-29 OCTOBER: RELEASE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE ON DISMANTLING OF THE
BASES**

The volume of Soviet propaganda on the crisis was increased on 28 October from 68 to a still more massive 73 percent of total commentary time to all audiences. But the dearth of actual comment continued following the release of the text of Khrushchev's new message. Broadcast time was largely given over to wide rebroadcasting of the message to audiences around the world--a total of 194 times. (The 27 October message had been broadcast 181 times.) The release of the new message was followed by a flood of roundups of worldwide publicity and acclaim for the Soviet leader's actions. Considerable time was devoted to reporting the approbation of Soviet citizens.

In domestic service newscasts, programs following the initial (1400 GMT) release of the message led off with the text, followed by the text of the President's statement welcoming it. By the latter part of the day,

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the 2050 GMT news program led off with the President's statement without repeating Khrushchev's. The Khrushchev message was broadcast a total of five times in domestic newscasts on the 28th, at least twice on an all-station hookup. Domestic news programs on the 29th carried continuing reportage of Soviet workers' acclaim for the message, as well as reportage of the U Thant-Castro exchange and of world reaction. But by 1300 GMT on the 29th, the news shows were no longer devoting major attention to the subject.

PROPAGANDA MA-
CHINE UNPREPARED The paucity of discussion by regular station commentators testified to the propagandists' lack of preparation in the fast-moving situation. An official Soviet statement is normally followed up promptly with commentaries by such regulars as Viktorov or Alekseyev, usually broadcast widely, echoing the substance of the statement. There were no such commentaries on either 27 or 28 October.

The lack of advance notice to propagandists was also reflected in the broadcasting of the messages themselves. An hour after the 28 October message was released, the text of the 27 October message was still being broadcast by Moscow in several foreign languages, including Spanish to Cuba, Turkish, Persian, and English and Italian to Africa.

At 1400 GMT on the 28th, Khrushchev's message was read twice in full in Russian in the Moscow-to-Cuba service in hookup with the Soviet domestic service, with no translation into Spanish. At 1500 GMT, the text of the 27 October message was read in Spanish. Since then, the 28 October message has been rebroadcast a total of at least 26 times in Spanish to Cuba in text or summary form.

Just as the Soviet central newspapers on 28 October replaced the leading articles with the text of the 27 October Khrushchev message, so the 29 October PRAVDA--the only central paper published on Mondays--led off with the text of Khrushchev's 28 October message and carried no editorial. TASS' review of PRAVDA said the paper also carried on the 29th the President's message of 27 October, "in reply to N. Khrushchev's letter of 26 October" which Soviet media had not previously acknowledged had been sent. Also published in the issue was the President's statement welcoming Khrushchev's message of the 28th, Castro's 28 October statement (which some Soviet broadcasts summarized without mentioning his call for removal of the Guantanamo base), and the U Thant-Castro exchange.

Broadcast media on the 29th carried the President's letter in reply to Khrushchev's 28 October message. There is still no record of Moscow's

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having acknowledged the White House statement of 27 October which rejected the Cuba-for-Turkey bases proposal.

STRESS ON SOVIET PEACE INITIATIVE The central theme of all the propaganda was typified by a Kharkov commentary transmitted by TASS on the 29th: "The world, which in the past week had the greatest fears for peace because of the piratic actions by the United States in the Caribbean, has heaved a sign of relief...brought about by the new peace initiative of the Soviet Government set out in Premier Khrushchev's messages to President Kennedy."

Soviet working people were said to be unanimously acclaiming the Khrushchev message and Soviet policy in general, "which even in a most complicated situation finds a way to avert the threat of thermonuclear war." Reports on domestic and worldwide reaction pictured a mood of great relief at the abatement of the crisis and of gratitude for Khrushchev's action. A Krasnoyarsk steelworker was quoted as saying: "Last night we worked with our minds at peace and with profound confidence that peace will be preserved and consolidated."

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES There was repeated stress on the theme--used in both the 27 and 28 October Khrushchev messages--of peaceful settlement of complex international questions. Khrushchev's action was hailed as not only having averted thermonuclear war but as having opened the way for "solving many questions by peaceful means." A Kirghiz academician was quoted as saying that the Soviet Government "will not relax its efforts in the struggle to find a successful solution to other important international questions" mentioned in the message." The questions were not specified, however. There was no singling out of the negotiable areas mentioned by Khrushchev on the 28th--detente between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organization (here Khrushchev's message had picked up the reference to such a detente in the President's letter), a nuclear weapons ban, and general disarmament. A domestic service broadcast observed that Khrushchev's action on the 28th "has to a considerable degree increased the hope of the people that a nuclear war will be averted once and for all," but the broadcast did not spell out the allusion to disarmament.

Most of the propaganda referred broadly to the principle of peaceful negotiation. A commentary for Danish listeners on 29 October, for example, said that "the sensible attitude and statesmanship of the USSR have shown that it is possible to solve the most urgent questions by peaceful means through negotiations." In rounding up Soviet reaction to Khrushchev's message, Moscow quoted Leningrad steelworkers as saying that "wisdom will triumph and all controversial questions will be settled by negotiations."

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And an educator was quoted as saying that the Khrushchev message "offers wide possibilities for talks." The reading of the 28 October message over Yerevan radio was prefaced by the statement that Khrushchev "is proposing to the President of the United States to settle all problems through peaceful means."

TASS reported under a London dateline that Bertrand Russell spoke of "mankind's" debt "to Nikita Khrushchev for his courage and his determination to prevent war due to American militarism." And there was personal adulation of Khrushchev in reportage of Soviet citizens' comments--a reference to "Comrade Khrushchev, the great fighter for peace," for example, and a reference to "the ideas developed by" Khrushchev as "designed to promote the speediest solution of many questions by peaceful means."

In official reiteration of the peaceful-negotiations theme, TASS quoted Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov as saying on his arrival in New York that "the Soviet Government has advanced quite a number of constructive proposals and is striving to use any opportunity to solve disputed international problems in a peaceful way through talks."

WARNINGS OF PER-
SISTING THREAT TO
PEACE

Following the exchange of messages on 28 October, Moscow curtailed and softened its denunciations of U.S. "aggression" in regard to Cuba. But the United States continued to be blamed for having started the crisis, and rather vague warnings of "aggression" continued to appear. Moscow home service cautioned that

the enemies of peace will continue to try to kindle the fire of a world war and will stage provocations to increase international tension. Our government, however, will go on campaigning for the security of mankind and for a stable peace in every corner of the world.

TASS summarized a World Peace Council statement from Stockholm which asserted that "the crisis is not yet over." Peace-lovers, it said, "must not relax their vigilance" and "must act" to "eliminate discrimination" against Cuba and "prevent any new aggression."

Declaring that "it is now up to the United States to take steps toward a peaceful solution of the crisis," Kharkov's TASS commentary warned that "some circles in the United States seem to be clinging to old dogmas and old methods in an effort to preserve tension in the Caribbean." In support of this, Kharkov pointed to reports that "Cuban counterrevolutionaries" were still active.

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There was little mention of the issue of U.S. air incursions raised by Khrushchev. A Viktorov commentary on 29 October stressed the need for the "great powers" to "avoid acts which...might endanger peace." Viktorov pointed to reports of "the incessantly repeated incursions of American aircraft over Cuban airspace" and "the incursion of an American reconnaissance aircraft over the Chukotka peninsula" in the Soviet Union. A brief TASS English item asserted that U.S. U-2 flights "are becoming increasingly active in the Middle East of late."

29-30 OCTOBER: SUSTAINED STRESS ON MAJOR SOVIET "VICTORY"

The volume of Soviet propaganda on the crisis registered a sharp drop on 29 October for the first time since the 24th, falling from the preceding day's 73 percent to 58 percent of total comment. The President's letter of reply to Khrushchev was widely broadcast. Commentators continued on 29 and 30 October to play heavily on the theme that the USSR, by exacting disclaimers of military action against Cuba, had managed to foil U.S. aggression and scored a major victory for world peace. A Zhukov-Mayevskiy article in PRAVDA claimed that as a result of the USSR's peaceloving policy, supported by world opinion,

a situation has taken shape in which it is impossible to implement the initial Pentagon plans for a military invasion of the island of freedom, and the military blockade has had to be renounced..... The Pentagon had to beat a retreat.

A Vladivostok regional broadcast stated that "the retreat of the United States in the Caribbean conflict" resulted from Soviet "restraint of the aggressor."

The propaganda dealt briefly but warmly with the role of the United Nations. One commentary equated U Thant's actions to the "calmness" of Khrushchev and the "firmness" of the Cubans.

SENSITIVITY TO
WESTERN VIEW OF
SOVIET BACKDOWN

At the same time, the propaganda beamed abroad displayed sensitivity to assertions by "Western commentators" that the Soviet Union had backed down or suffered a setback. A Moscow broadcast in French, for example, assailed these "commentators" for "talking about a military setback for the Soviet Union by making it appear that the USSR had to yield to force and to accept the American threat" and for saying that Khrushchev "for the first time" had to accept conditions imposed by the United States. Nothing, the broadcast said, could be further from the truth.

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A TASS commentary declared that "it would be a big mistake" to speak of a "retreat" by the Soviet Union. By pursuing this "so-to-speak logic," the TASS commentator said, one could claim that "any success in the struggle for the preservation of peace, and for the rights of peoples to build their lives as they see fit," is not a victory but a retreat for the forces of peace and progress." He went on to assert that millions of people have faith in the "immutable" peace policy of the USSR, and also "believe in the defensive might of the Soviet Union and see in it a reliable bulwark preventing imperialism from starting another war."

EXPLANATIONS, RE-
ASSURANCES TO
CUBA

Moscow implied to Cuban listeners that the Castro government shares--or should share--the Soviet appraisal of Khrushchev's action as a victory. A commentary tailored for Cuban listeners stated that a U.S. promise not to invade Cuba "is precisely what the Soviet Union and the Cuban Government have tried to achieve all the time." A commentary broadcast three times exclusively to Cuba--making the first unequivocal admission in Moscow propaganda that "Soviet rockets" had been installed in Cuba--explained that "the Soviet rockets on your island" were "destined to serve as a guarantee" against aggression and can now be removed because President Kennedy has been "made" to disclaim any intentions of invading Cuba. Commentaries broadcast repeatedly to Cuba cited passages in Khrushchev's 28 October message to the President in which he pledges continuing support to Cuba.

(Thus reassuring the Cuban people, Moscow told listeners in North America that because President Kennedy "now says that the United States will not invade Cuba, the USSR has no need to give defense aid to the island republic.")

CASTRO'S FIVE
CONDITIONS

While the propaganda extensively praised the Cuban people and the Cuban revolution, there were relatively few references to Castro personally. Commentators at first ignored Castro's five demands--including the return of Guantanamo--advanced in his 28 October statement. By 30 October they began to refer to them approvingly, though not widely. A talk by Shragin on that date, broadcast both to Soviet and Cuban audiences, said the five conditions "answer the interests of normalizing the situation in the Caribbean and assuring the independence and integrity of the Cuban republic." Shragin said "all peoples would benefit" from the steps Castro outlined, including the American people themselves, in a situation still tense as a result of "provocative statements" by persons in the United States not wanting a relaxation of tensions.

Subsequent comment, including a talk in Polish, said Castro was "completely justified in putting forward a number of theses designed to guarantee

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the sovereignty of Cuba"--and went on to enumerate the "theses," including the evacuation of Guantanamo. Cuban audiences were told that Castro's demands had "the support of the peace forces." Latin American countries "and all progressive mankind" expressed their solidarity with the Cuban people, Cuban audiences were assured.

Thus Soviet commentators expressed sympathy and increasingly warm support for the raising of the demands by Castro (or "the Cuban people"). Polyanov, in a commentary broadcast to Cuba among other audiences, said that "in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, there is warm support for the recent declaration of the Cuban Prime Minister, Fidel Castro, listing the measures required to guarantee Cuba against aggression." Polyanov summarized the measures, including evacuation of Guantanamo. But he went on to state that "here the United Nations [whose role Havana propaganda was conspicuously playing down] can show itself as an important instrument of peace defending the interests of all countries," and he declared that "international conflicts can and must be solved in a constructive manner on the basis of talks."

TURKISH BASES

There was a low-keyed renewal of the notion that removal of Soviet bases in Cuba might be matched by elimination of U.S. bases in Turkey, though without specific mention of Khrushchev's 27 October proposal to this effect. A commentary in Persian brought up the idea of removing the Turkish bases, and a broadcast to Turkey said the removal of the bases "would help to improve the international climate." In domestic media, a Vladivostok regional service commentary said it "would be well" if the United States "reciprocated" by dismantling its Turkish bases. And a Soviet worker was quoted in another regional broadcast as asking: "How long will the American warmongers continue with impunity to establish their bases right near the frontiers of the Soviet Union? It is time to stop this lawlessness."

A Moscow radio newscast in Spanish to Latin America reported under an Accra dateline a local paper's comment that the United States should dismantle its foreign bases, "including the Guantanamo naval base" and that Turkey should ask for the dismantling of U.S. bases on Turkish soil. At this writing, however, the Turkish-bases theme has not been vigorously pressed.